Fifteen Arguments For the Existence of God
Introduction
Like many philosophy majors, I became convinced early in my undergraduate career that all of the arguments for the existence of God were, at best, amusingly preposterous and, at worst, embarrassing failures — the very epitome of the sort of transparently motivated reasoning and wishful thinking that a burgeoning Serious Thinker ought to avoid at all costs. I regarded this as something of sad fact, as I was not exactly satisfied or at peace with scientific materialism (which, at the time, seemed to me like the only intellectually respectable worldview in the early 21st Century) and its myriad entailments.
However, this attitude began to give way, ever so slowly, once I began teaching philosophy myself, during graduate school. In particular, when I taught my first philosophy of religion class in the spring of 2017, I realized that the best versions of the traditional arguments for God’s existence were in fact pretty strong, by the normal standards of assessment (and I had also learned by then that just about all philosophical arguments are vulnerable to serious objections from rational, informed people; arguments for God are by no means unique in that regard). By the time I found myself teaching the same course again three years later, I was — to my own surprise — starting to think that some of the traditional arguments for God’s existence, along with some non-traditional ones, might actually be sound (i.e., have true premises in addition to formal validity or cogency).
In the five years since that time, arguments for God have dominated my attention (to the bemusement, befuddlement, and even consternation of more than a few onlookers): I’ve read countless articles and books on these arguments, listened to endless hours of debates and interviews with leading experts on them — and thought about them relentlessly and painstakingly on long runs, long walks, long drives, during meals, standing in lines, while doing dishes…(you get the picture).
Now that I’ve returned to writing, I’ll be sharing my thoughts about these arguments in detail. In this post, I’ll just offer brief glosses of the fifteen arguments to which I’ve probably given the most thought — and which have, over time, led to my assigning a far higher probability to God’s existence than my New Atheist-influenced tortured agnostic undergraduate self could have entertained.
Fifteen Arguments
Before setting out the arguments, some terminological and conceptual clarification is in order. I understand God to be a perfect, or unlimited, mind; God is by conception the ultimate being, and the ultimate being is a maximally great conscious subject. Theism is the view on which God, so defined, exists. Atheism is the view that neither God, nor gods (i.e., finite deities, such as Zeus), exist. Naturalism is the view that there are only natural kinds and properties, where “natural kinds and properties” just are those kinds and properties which figure in our best scientific theories. Materialism is a variety of naturalism on which matter is the only substance in existence.
1. The Contingency Argument
It seems that the universe — material reality, however big that is (and regardless of whether it’s limited to the observable universe which began expanding from a tiny singularity some ~14 billion years ago) — is contingent. That is, it seems that the universe might not have existed at all, or that it might have existed in many (possibly infinitely many) different ways (e.g., it could have had different laws and initial conditions; it could have consisted of one more or one fewer electron, etc.).
Contingent things are such that they admit of explanation. Ordinarily, we explain contingent things in terms of other contingent things (e.g., one contingent event is explained in terms of some earlier contingent event; one contingent being is explained in terms of some other contingent being).
However, if we add up all the contingent things, they together form a set — namely, the set of all contingent things — which itself cries out for explanation, given that we can reasonably wonder why that set of contingent things exists rather than some other possible set.
The only thing that could explain the set of all contingent things would, by definition, have to be necessary: something such that it could not have been otherwise.
Conceptual analysis reveals God to be the best candidate for a necessary being. How so? If you think about the concept of a being that couldn’t be otherwise, you’ll quickly see that there’s strong reason to suppose that it’s the concept of an immaterial being, given that material beings (in all of our experience) are subject to change, destruction, and division. Because the necessary being would have to be beyond the universe (i.e., not itself a member of the set of all contingent things), it would of course have to be beyond the limits of space and time. And since arguably any kind of arbitrary limit on the being’s power would be incompatible with its necessity (since arbitrary limits are, by their nature, limits which could have been otherwise), there’s good reason to suppose that the being would have to be maximally perfect — and a maximally perfect, necessarily existent immaterial being just is what we mean by “God”.
A Statement of the Argument From Contingency
The totality of physical reality is at least part of the set of all contingent things (maybe there are contingent non-physical things, such as finite immaterial minds).
The set of all contingent things is itself contingent.
What’s contingent requires explanation in terms of something beyond itself.
So, the set of all contingent things requires explanation in terms of something necessary (given that everything contingent is included in the set of all contingent things).
The best candidate for a necessary item which explains all of contingent reality is a maximally perfect mind.
So, probably, there exists a maximally perfect mind (i.e., God).
2. The Ontological Argument
The concept of God, as suggested above, just is the concept of a maximally perfect being — “that-than-which-none-greater-can-be-conceived”, as St. Anselm put it. Plausibly, existence in concrete reality (as opposed to existence as a mere idea) is itself a perfection, or a “great-making-property”. If so, then insofar as God has every possible perfection, then God must really exist — for if God were to exist as a mere idea, then a greater being would be possible (namely, one that really existed!); however, by definition, no being could be greater than God. So, that-than-which-none-greater-can-be-conceived must actually exist. That is, God must really exist.
This may seem too easy; however, it’s an argument which has fascinated philosophers for a millennium, and it’s famously much easier to mock and deride the argument as a mere “word game” (or some such) than it is to actually demonstrate where the argument goes wrong. Perhaps this is because the argument does, in fact, just work.
A Statement of the Ontological Argument
The concept of God is the concept of a being with every possible perfection.
God is a possible being: the concept of God contains no contradictions (i.e., all of the possible perfections are compossible and so can inhere in a particular being).
Existence in reality is a perfection.
So, the concept of God is the concept of a being which exists in reality.
So, God exists in reality.
3. The Argument From Consciousness
In all of reality, consciousness — what-it’s-likeness; first-person awareness; the subjective perspective — is the surest thing: it’s the one thing which certainly must exist. You know this immediately because it’s like something to be you; there’s a particular experiential character to be processing in your mind these words (or pixel-representations of words, more precisely) on your screen. Indeed, the reality of your consciousness is far more manifest than the screen, given that the screen might in principle be an illusion — whereas your experience of it must be real just in case you’re having it.
And yet, if you think about it, it’s really an extraordinary thing that consciousness exists at all. Why is it like something to be you?
On theism, the foundation of reality is an unlimited conscious mind; it’s unsurprising that such a mind would generate additional minds (given that minds have value, and given that an unlimited mind seems like just the right sort of entity to produce more minds) — whereas it is at least somewhat surprising that other ontological foundations (e.g., non-conscious particles) could, or would, generate any minds at all. Indeed, it’s not at all clear how, or that, conscious experience could arise from non-experiential stuff.
In response to this challenge, it’s open to the materialist (i.e., to the person who affirms that there is only matter) to deny that matter is non-experiential; to adopt some form of panpsychism. But this would, in a certain respect, arguably in itself be a kind of concession to the Argument From Consciousness (insofar as it represents a repudiation of what has come to be regarded as standard materialism), precisely due to standard materialism’s inability to account for the most apparent fact of existence). Moreover, matter’s being conscious seems to fit better with theism than with atheism (given that consciousness has value, you might expect a perfect mind to create conscious matter, whereas conscious matter is kind of surprising on atheism).
A Statement of an Argument From Consciousness
Consciousness exists.
On theism, it’s a certainty that consciousness exists (given that God is, by conception, a conscious mind) — and God can be expected to create additional conscious minds, given their value and given God’s creative power.
On atheism, there’s no reason to expect the existence of any consciousness at all.
So, the existence of consciousness is evidence for theism.
4. The Argument From Psychophysical Harmony
[Credit for this argument is due to the contemporary philosophers Brian Cutter and Dustin Crummett: https://philarchive.org/rec/CUTPHA]
We aren’t merely conscious beings: our consciousness is, apparently, causally efficacious, and it harmonizes with what our bodies do in ways that make sense: our negative affective states arise as a result of harm; our positive affective states arise as a result of things that are good for us; decisions to move our bodies in various ways result in our bodies moving in the ways we intend. To be more concrete: when you stub your toe, you feel pain; when you bite into your favorite dessert, you feel pleasure; when you decide to raise your right hand, you raise your right hand.
However, we can easily imagine a world in which such psychophysical harmony did not exist: in which our physical states did not relate to our phenomenal (i.e., experiential) states in a manner that made any sense.
And no, evolution doesn’t account for psychophysical harmony one bit: evolution operates on behavior, selecting for those behaviors which are broadly adaptive; it doesn’t “care” one bit about an organism’s phenomenal states: an organism that avoids predators and obtains lots of food and mates will pass on its genes even if its experiential states are in radical disharmony with its physical states.
Now, you might be thinking that psychophysical harmony correlates with adaptive behavior and so gets selected for indirectly in that way. However, the fact that this correlation exists just is the very phenomenon in need of explanation: why does psychophysical harmony correlate with adaptive behavior, given that we can easily imagine it having been otherwise?
While a cold, indifferent universe would have no reason to generate psychophysical harmony, God would. Why? Because psychophysical harmony is valuable: it’s a prerequisite for being responsible for our actions, planning our lives, coordinating our behavior, and forming meaningful relationships — all things about which a perfect being would have reason to care. In this way, psychophysical harmony constitutes confirmatory evidence for theism.
A Statement of the Argument From Psychophysical Harmony
Psychophysical harmony is the norm for conscious creatures: generally speaking, our phenomenal states rationally harmonize with our physical states.
On theism, psychophysical harmony is expected: God would have reasons for valuing psychophysical harmony.
On atheism, there’s no reason to expect psychophysical harmony to be the norm for conscious creatures.
So, psychophysical harmony is evidence for theism.
5. The Argument From Immaterial Minds
There are serious reasons for supposing that minds are immaterial; I’ll briefly offer three. First, minds and their contents don’t seem to fit in the same logical category as rocks, tables, chairs, protons, electrons, and so forth (what, exactly, is the size and the shape of a thought?). Second, we can easily conceive of a physical replica of our world that is utterly devoid of consciousness; insofar as a conceivability is a guide to possibility, this suggests that consciousness is neither identical to nor metaphysically dependent upon physical goings on. Third, our knowledge of mathematical, logical, modal, and moral truths is (plausibly) knowledge of various immaterial truths; but if our minds were material, then it’s unclear how we could apprehend such truths.
Immaterial minds fit well with theism, insofar as theism holds that the fundamental existent just is an immaterial mind. Given other ontological foundations, it’s unclear why — or how — we should expect immaterial minds to ever emerge.
A Statement of the Argument From Immaterial Minds
Plausibly, there are immaterial minds.
On theism, immaterial minds are expected: God is an immaterial mind and, by conception, has reasons and the power to create more such minds.
On atheism, there is no reason to expect any immaterial minds.
So, if immaterial minds exist, they’re evidence for theism.
6. The Argument From Agential Freedom
Agential freedom (a broader and less fraught notion than free will), understood in the most deflationary sense, is the power of agent to perform acts which are, in some respect, under the agent’s control. The existence of any agential freedom at all is surprising on accounts of reality on which fundamental reality is indifferent and, thus, not oriented towards the production of valuable things. But God would have reason to desire agents to have control over their acts; a world in which agents’ act were disconnected from their character would have far less value than the sort of word in which we find ourselves. Thus, the existence of any kind of any kind of agential freedom — any kind of power of an agent to exercise control over his or her acts — is evidence for theism.
The Argument From Agential Freedom
There is agential freedom.
On theism, agential freedom is expected, given its value.
On atheism, agential freedom is not expected: absent God or gods, there’s no reason to expect reality to produce agents at all, let alone ones who enjoy significant varieties of freedom.
So, the existence of agential freedom is evidence for theism.
7. The Argument From Moral Knowledge and Agency
There are some objective moral facts: that is, facts concerning what we should do and what we should value which don’t depend upon what anyone happens to believe. For example: objectively, inflicting needless suffering on someone for fun is wrong, and love is in-itself-good. This much is obvious to anyone who isn’t in the grip of some nihilistic ideology. That there are agents who have moral knowledge, though, is surprising: even given life and the natural evolutionary process which takes over once life emerges, the existence of creatures able or disposed to think about morality was, antecedently, highly unlikely. Indeed, in the whole history of life on Earth there, there has been only one species with full-fledged moral awareness — and our emergence was no biological inevitability.
Even given the existence of rational creatures capable of thinking about morality, there is no inevitability that these creatures will gain moral knowledge. We might, for example, have had radically different moral intuitions, so that our moral beliefs did not align at all with the moral facts. We might also have been indifferent to the moral facts, recognizing them yet feeling utterly unmotivated by them.
An indifferent reality should not be expected to produce agents who can engage in moral deliberation, act on moral reasons, and perform acts subject to moral evaluation — but insofar as the existence of such agents is good, God would have reason to bring them into being. In this way, moral agency and moral knowledge constitute evidence for theism.
A Statement of the Argument From Moral Knowledge and Agency
We are moral agents, and we have some moral knowledge
On theism, moral agents with moral knowledge are expected: God would have reason to desire for there to exist morally-aware creatures.
On atheism, there’s no reason to expect for there to be moral agents with moral knowledge.
So, the existence of moral agents with moral knowledge is evidence for theism.
8. The Argument From the Reliability of Our Perceptual and Cognitive Faculties
We have broadly reliable cognitive and perceptual faculties: we perceive the world more or less as it is, and we’re able to reason our way to all sorts of true beliefs. I take this to be a Moorean Fact (i.e., a proposition more obvious than any premise in an argument for its negation).
And yet, things didn’t have to be this way. Certainly evolution doesn’t “care” whether we have accurate perceptions or true beliefs: the forces of selection operate only on behavior and its causal antecedents.
God, however, would have reasons for placing us in a world which we could understand and perceive accurately. So, the fact that our cognitive and perceptual faculties are reliable is some evidence for theism.
The Argument From the Reliability of Our Perceptual and Cognitive Faculties
Our perceptual and cognitive faculties are broadly reliable.
On theism, the existence of agents with broadly reliable perceptual and cognitive faculties is expected.
On atheism, the existence of such agents is not expected.
Therefore, the existence of agents with broadly reliable perceptual and cognitive faculties is evidence for theism.
9. The Fine-Tuning Argument
Findings in contemporary physics and cosmology suggest that the universe is, in various ways, fine-tuned for the emergence of life. Had, for example, the value of the cosmological constant, the mass of the neutron, or the strength of the force of gravity been only slightly different, then life never would have emerged. Indeed, theoretical physicists tell us that, of the innumerable possible ways our universe might have been, the conditions for any conceivable form of life (and not only carbon-based life) would have been possible in only a vanishingly small portion of them. Thus, we need an explanation of why ours is a life-permitting universe, given that this outcome was antecedently highly improbable (and given that, by ordinary epistemic standards, antecedently highly improbable events need to be explained).
There really are only two possible answers here. One is The Multiverse Hypothesis, according to which there are indeterminately many (perhaps infinitely many) universes. Thus, so goes the thought, we shouldn’t be surprised that we exist in a life-permitting universe, given that some such universes will exist within the multiverse — and of course observers like ourselves will exist only within those universes in which it’s possible for us to exist.
The major problem with that response is that not just any multiverse will explain fine-tuning, given that, of the logically possible multiverses, most will contain no life-permitting universes. Only a multiverse which is itself fine-tuned for generating life-permitting universes will explain the fine-tuning of our universe. But then the multiverse’s fine-tuning would require explanation.
Theism offers an explanation of fine-tuning insofar as the existence of God predicts the existence of at least some universe (and perhaps many universes) containing life, given that life is a prerequisite for the emergence of embodied consciousness subjects, who add to enormously to the value of a universe (such that God would have reasons creating arenas in which they could exist). In this way, the fine-tuning data constitute confirmatory evidence for theism.
A Statement of the Argument From Fine-Tuning
The universe is fine-tuned for the emergence of life.
On theism, fine-tuning is expected: God would have reasons for creating a universe fine-tuned for life.
On atheism, fine-tuning is unexpected.
So, fine-tuning is evidence for theism.
10. The Argument From the Intelligibility of Nature and the Effectiveness of Mathematics
Nature — the natural world — is intelligible, in the sense that we can investigate and make sense of it; science works! Nature operates according to regularities which permit us to understand it and make general actions about it which hold across time and space. Moreover, nature admits of characterization in terms of laws which can be described mathematically; this is what Eugene Wigner referred to as “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics”.
The intelligibility of nature is evidence for theism insofar as God would desire an intelligible order that can be characterized formally by way of mathematics; the existence of such an order is surprising on non-theistic hypotheses, especially given what theoretical physics tells us of the other ways natural reality could have been.
A Statement of the Argument From the Intelligibility of the Nature and the Effectiveness of Mathematics
Nature is intelligible and can be described in the language of mathematics.
On theism, this is expected: God is, by conception, a supremely intelligent and rational mind; such a mind would value order and intelligibility (and would have the power to bring them about).
On atheism, the intelligibility and mathematical describability of nature is unexpected.
So, that nature is intelligible and can be described in the language mathematics is evidence for theism.
11. The Argument From Widespread and Enduring Belief In an Ultimate Being
That some proposition P is widely believed, particularly by relevant experts and great minds, is defeasible reason to believe P (given that such facts are often well-explained by P’s being true and difficult to explain if P is false).
It has been widely believed that God exists — and even more widely believed that some ultimate being exists (given that even in some religious traditions in which God is not explicitly posited, some kind of God-like ultimate something often is posited). Indeed, it seems safe to say that most humans who have ever lived have believed in God, or else something very God-like.
It’s unclear whether there are any relevant experts with respect to the question of God’s existence. However, plausibly, philosophers and history’s greatest minds (e.g., Aristotle, Plato, Newton, Leibniz, etc.) are the relevant experts — and, at least before the 20th century, most of them were theists. Even in contemporary philosophy, those philosophers who know the most about the arguments for God’s existence — philosophers of religion — are theists (and it does not seems that this can be accounted for solely by a selection effect (i.e., by the fact that philosophy of religion selects for philosophers who were theists before they carefully considered the arguments).
Moreover, the perseverance of theistic belief is some evidence for theism insofar as we should expect belief in God to persevere through history (despite persecution, social pressure, etc.) if God exists. However, such perseverance is at least somewhat surprising on atheism.
A Statement of the Argument From the Widespread and Enduring Belief In an Ultimate Being
There is, and has long been, widespread and enduring belief in an ultimate being.
On theism, this is unsurprising: we should expect God’s existence to be widely perceived if God exists (given that God would have reason to want people to know of his existence).
On atheism, widespread and enduring belief in an ultimate being is unexpected: if there is no such being, then it’s surprising that belief in God would have caught on at all.
So, widespread and enduring belief in an ultimate being is evidence for theism.
12. The Argument From Miracle Reports
There seem to be some well-evidenced miracle reports: that is, reports of events which defy naturalistic explanation. These range from reports of inexplicable healings, to Marian apparitions, to levitating monks and nuns. If one actually looks into these reports with an open mind, one will find that many are very hard to dismiss.
On theism, we should expect miracles — and, thus, compelling miracle reports: God would have reasons (e.g., an interest in making his presence known) for sometimes contravening the laws of nature.
But well-evidenced miracle reports are, at the very least, somewhat awkward aspects of reality for the committed naturalist. Perhaps they are less awkward for non-theistic supernaturalists; however, if one has to adopt non-theistic supernaturalism in order to account for miracle reports, that is itself a kind of dialectic victory for the theist.
The Arguments From Miracle Reports
There are well-evidence miracles reports.
On theism, such reports are unsurprising: God can, and would have reasons to, sometimes contravene the laws of nature.
If theism is false, then 1 is surprising (why should there be widespread belief in an ultimate being if there is no such being?).
So, that there is, and long has been, widespread and enduring belief in an ultimate being is evidence for theism.
13. The Argument From Near-Death Experiences
Near-death-experiences (NDEs), in the sense relevant here, are experiences of people who have come extremely close to bodily death (e.g., to the point of their heart ceasing to beat for some time) but, upon returning to consciousness, report having had various sorts of out-of-body experiences, meetings with deceased, relatives, feelings of profound peace, and so forth.
These experiences often seem to align striking ways with various religious and spiritual expectations about what is likely to come upon bodily death — and which are unexpected on atheism.
While I don’t put much stock in NDEs, I think that they are some part of a broad evidence base which results in theism comparing favorably to rival hypotheses about fundamental reality.
The Argument From NDEs
There are NDEs.
On theism, NDEs are expected because theism predicts an afterlife (NDEs point to an afterlife — and an afterlife is good, while the annihilation of persons is bad).
On atheism, NDEs are unexpected: we should expect bodily death mark the end of existence.
So, NDEs are evidence for theism.
14. The Argument From Beauty
Beauty is good. Plausibly, it is intrinsically good. So, God should be expected to create a beautiful world — and, indeed, the world in which find ourselves is indeed beautiful. By contrast, there is no reason to expect a fundamental indifference reality to produce beauty. So, the beauty of the world is a prediction of theism but is unexpected on atheism.
A Statement of the Argument From Beauty
There is a great deal of beauty in the world.
On theism, beauty is expected: beauty is good, and God would have reason to create a world with a lot of goodness.
On atheism, beauty is surprising: one shouldn’t expect an indifferent reality to create a beautiful world.
So, the world’s beauty is evidence for theism.
15. The Argument From Love
Love — which I understand as (approximately) willing the good of another, in conjunction with fitting feelings of affection, which give rise to a proper sense of attachment — is also, plausibly, another intrinsic good. Indeed, it is perhaps the greatest of the intrinsic goods.
Not only would God have reason to create a world in which there is love, but theism might entail the existence of love, insofar as love might be part of God’s essential nature (“God is love”).
But love is surprising on atheism, insofar as we can imagine that even if the behaviors associated with love might have been necessary for the survival and propagation of certain species, these behaviors could have served their adaptive function entirely in the absence of any experience of love at all (i.e., without love, given that love is essentially experiential).
So, the existence of love at all, some reason to think that God exists.
A Statement of the Argument From the Argument From Love
There is love.
On theism, love is expected — not only because love is good, but also because it is plausibly essential to God’s very nature.
On atheism, love is not expected: insofar as it is adaptive, that’s only because of a link between the experience of and certain behaviors — and such a link is itself surprising on atheism.
So, the existence of love is evidence for theism.
Conclusion
Bear in mind three points. First, none of these arguments is stated in its most rigorous form or developed at any length (countless papers and books have been written on most of them). Second, I’ve not claimed that any of these arguments is decisive, nor have I said exactly how much each should increase one’s overall confidence that theism is true (and one’s overall confidence in theism should reflect one’s assessment of one’s total body of relevant evidence, not just an isolated bit of it). Third evidence can support some hypothesis, H1, while also conferring some support on another hypothesis, H2; so evidence can raise the probability of theism while also raising the probability of some alternative hypothesis (e.g., the hypothesis that reality is impersonal, and yet also oriented towards the good).
Generally speaking, I don’t think that one should expect a single line of argument to decisively establish some big conclusion (such as that God exists) — and in any case one should rarely significantly update one’s views in a substantial way because of a single argument or a single experience (though there are exceptions to this rule); one should instead follow many lines of evidence and see if there is convergence among them.
The purpose of this post has only been (a) to clarify some of my own thoughts and (b) to introduce readers to some lines of evidence which, by lights, point towards theism — and which have, over time, have moved me significantly towards theism from an agnosticism that tilted heavily towards atheism. I’ll have more to say about each argument in the future, here and elsewhere.
>However, this attitude began to give way, ever so slowly, once I began teaching philosophy myself, during graduate school.
You’re not alone in that: both Edward Feser and C.S. Lewis became theists in part because they started teaching philosophy and found the old arguments stronger than they had supposed.
I think the ontological argument fails for reasons I give here https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Y-iuBo7EXnXVH9O0J3nETKQMI7KU5U8O2FMdszA3fVA/edit?usp=sharing