Mattering

What does it mean for something to "matter"?

My concern in this post will be with the concept of mattering (it seems only fitting that the first post of a blog purporting to be about what matters ought to say something about the nature of mattering, itself).

According to my understanding,

(M) something matters just in case it is an object of significance and, thus, merits concern.   

What I will suggest here is that (a) the belief that some things matter is fundamental to what we might call the commonsense view of the world (i.e., the way in which we ordinarily think about things, prior to philosophical investigation) and that (b) the notion of mattering to which we are pre-theoretically committed is one entailing that there is value really out in the world, to be discovered. This contrasts with views (which have become quite prominent, and embedded in much of modern culture) according to which value is merely projected, constructed, or imagined.

1. The View of Commonsense

From the view of commonsense, there is much that matters.  Among the things commonly taken to matter are - perhaps most obviously, and significantly - various individuals; most prominently, our family members, friends, companion animals, and associates.  Also very high on the list will rank the major goals and commitments that orient us in the world and give our lives subjective meaning, in that these ground projects make our lives matter to us - at least in the ideal case.  Slightly more abstractly, it is widely believed that members of at least one class of beings (e.g., homo sapiens, sentient creatures, rational agents, etc.) matter, in virtue of their status as members of that class of beings.  Additionally, inanimate objects - such as revered works of art, monuments, historic buildings, cherished books, family heirlooms, and the like - are often regarded as mattering (indeed, both individuals and human societies often go to great lengths to maintain and preserve such objects).  Furthermore, some people apparently believe that certain features of the natural world - such as elaborate rock formations, ancient trees, lush forests, oceans, rivers, and even entire ecosystems - matter.  No doubt there are more things than the aforementioned that matter on the commonsense view, but these categories will suffice for now; my aim here is not to provide an exhaustive catalogue of things ordinarily thought to matter (though that would, I think, be a worthy undertaking).

The preceding highlights an important fact, which is that there is considerable disagreement when it comes to mattering. Specifically, there is disagreement concerning what matters; disagreement concerning the degree to which various things matter (for mattering does, on the ordinary understanding, seem to come in degrees, so that some things matter more than others); and there is disagreement concerning which things matter intrinsically. 

However, whatever our disagreements, that we generally believe some things to matter is at least suggested by the apparent truth that we ordinarily regard some objects as giving us, or themselves constituting, reasons for action.  For example, that we view our family and friends as mattering is what explains the fact that we take ourselves to have reasons to help them when they are in need; that we think persons matter is why we regard it as wrong to cause them unnecessary harm; that we regard historically significant objects and sites as mattering that most of us would find it horrific to, for example, bulldoze the great pyramids of Egypt in order to construct an outlet mall.  And it is as a consequence of understanding that life can go better and worse for many conscious creatures apart from human beings that some of us believe these creatures to merit a kind of respect that is incompatible with treating them as mere objects.  

Of course, it is one thing to say that something is believed to matter and quite another to say that it actually does matter.  It could well be the case that many of the things that the average person believes to matter in fact do not.  Perhaps nothing matters, as Nihilism holds.  I have meant only to motivate the thought that a complete explanation of our actions in everyday life must invoke the thought that we believe some things to matter.  If we believed nothing mattered, then while we might still act as if the objects of our own desires (whatever those might be) mattered, we would lack any sense of having ends that ought to be pursued, or obligations that ought to be met; nor would we have any sense of there being truly, objectively better and worse desires to harbor.  Some people of course do not seem to have any sense of such things being the case, but these people are few and far between; Nihilism is not the view of commonsense.

2. The Metaphysics of Mattering

If something matters, then it matters either intrinsically or instrumentally.  If something matters intrinsically, this means that it matters in itself, rather than merely in virtue of standing in some kind of relation with something else.  If something matters instrumentally, this means that it does not matter in itself but, rather, only in virtue of its connection to something that does matter in itself; that is, that matters intrinsically. Because I understand instrumental mattering to be essentially linked to intrinsic mattering, I will not make much of the distinction between the two. Rather, the relevant distinction for my purposes will, instead, be that between 

Stance-Independent Mattering (SIM): the facts concerning mattering are fixed by some fact (or set of facts) independent of anyone’s beliefs, preferences, emotions, or attitudes

and 

Stance-Dependent Mattering (SDM): the facts concerning mattering are fixed entirely by the beliefs, preferences, and/or attitudes of agents.  

I think that, in the end, it is only (SIM) which truly does justice to the concept of mattering; as is implicit (but not, I believe, presupposed) in my statement of (M), I think that whether something, x, matters to someone is a question distinct entirely from that of whether x in fact matters. We can be mistaken about what matters (e.g., think of Hitler…or simply think of the person who is convinced that what really matters in life is counting blades of grass), meaning that mattering is not just “in the head”.  

So, for example, if (as I believe) suffering matters in the stance-independent sense, this means that suffering matters because there is something about the state of suffering itself (e.g., the fact that it is, by its very nature, unpleasant to the one who suffers, or that it is intrinsically bad) that supplies us with some reason for caring about it.  Thus, (SIM) is an account that does not reduce all talk of mattering to talk merely in terms of psychological states.  

Additionally, (SIM) does not entail, or imply, that we are somehow in the business of “matter-making”.  If the account is true, then it is at least possible that there are things that matter independently of what anyone believes or desires.  Insofar as the commonsense view of the world entails that there are indeed such things, then it entails commitment to (SIM); so, anyone who rejects (SIM) is, to that extent, rejecting the viewpoint of commonsense (at least in this respect).  

This is, of course, not a decisive reason to affirm (SIM); however, it is some reason to do so, given the fairly standard philosophical assumption that the commitments of the commonsense view of the world enjoy prima facie justificatory support.  

If we endorse (SIM) as the true account of mattering, then we should in turn think that there is an essential connection between mattering and 

Value Realism: there exists stance-independent value (i.e., value that obtains independently of anyone’s beliefs, preferences, emotions, or attitudes).

For absent Value Realism, there would be no value in the world to fix the facts about what matters. (SIM), in other words, upon analysis, simply entails Value Realism.

Conclusion 

My contention here has been that anyone who wishes to affirm the commonsense view of the world must take seriously the notion of mattering. We all believe, or at least act as if we believe, that some things matter. Moreover, we believe that some things matter in the respect captured by the view I have termed 

Stance-Independent Mattering (SIM): the facts concerning mattering are fixed by some fact (or set of facts) independent of anyone’s beliefs, preferences, emotions, or attitudes.

And it turns out that commitment to (SIM) commits us, in turn, to the truth of

Value Realism: there exists stance-independent value (i.e., value that is independent of anyone’s beliefs, preferences, emotions, or attitudes).

In other words, it commits us to the idea that we can be mistaken about what matters, because some things really do matter (in the sense of having value, whether positive or negative), while others do not.