According to Value Realism, there is stance-independent value: value that obtains irrespective of what anyone believes, or desires. So, if Value Realism is true, then – given some uncontroversial assumptions about what is, in fact, valuable – things such as happiness, knowledge, friendship, and beauty are valuable
In one of your previous replies, you stated that you doubt that there are any arguments that could persuade a committed antirealist. I am not sure if you intended to convey that you were not interested in engaging with antirealists, but I certainly hope that isn't the case. I am interested in engaging with realists. Even if we cannot persuade one another, directly discussing one another's views can be both informative and help us refine our perspective. So I hope you support further engagement from antirealists.
I'd also add that I am not so sure I'm committed to antirealism in any direct way. I am committed to endorsing whatever position I believe is backed by the best reasons and evidence; it's possible to convince me of anything, moral realism included. So, I think I could be persuaded, by pretty conventional standards of what would constitute good reasons for endorsing a view.
In any case, I am delighted to see this series of posts in defense of moral realism, and I hope you will take my criticisms in the spirit they are intended: I am deeply interested in understanding the realist position and I think the best way to do so is to talk to realists, rather than just read what they have to say. Anyway, on to my remarks:
I suspect you may be right that enlightement concerns may play some causal role in the proliferation of moral antirealism. However, speaking for myself, I do not reject realism out of a commitment to physicalism. It’s not that value realism is “spooky” - I’m not quite sure what that means, it’s that it seems to me to be conceptually confused and explanatorily unnecessary. Furthermore, I believe we can explain why some people would think value realism is true without thinking value realism is true, and I think these explanations are better and more plausible than value realism being true.
You state: “This is why the same individuals who are happy to talk about quarks, gluons, multiverses, parallel worlds, and the like often become queasy when asked to believe that pain really is, in itself, bad.”
Perhaps some antirealists think this way. But if so, you’re targeting a fairly weak form of antirealism.
Quarks, gluons, and so forth can figure into our explanations of phenomena in ways that I don’t think suggesting that pain “really is, in itself, bad” do. In other words, the weird stuff posed by physics is weird in the sense that it doesn’t seem intuitive. But it does seem useful in making predictions and understanding how the world is. I don’t think value realism exhibits similar explanatory utility.
You state, “According to Subjectivism, the severely depressed person does not err about anything at all and so has no reason to attempt to escape the grip of depression.”
That’s not necessarily true. A person can both lack a desire to X, but also have a desire that they desire to X. In that case, the person could still err and still have a reason to escape the grip of depression: that reason being that they don’t want to be depressed.
We do not need value realism to judge that a person who is depressed would be better off not being depressed, where by “better” we mean something entirely subjective. I think I would be better off if I weren’t depressed, but I think I’d only be better off relative to some standard, such as my own standards. A depressed person might say they wouldn’t be better off. Perhaps they’re confused or mistaken. Or perhaps they have unusual preferences, but aren’t mistaken. All of this is consistent with antirealism. Nothing about depression seems to me to call for value realism.
In one of your previous replies, you stated that you doubt that there are any arguments that could persuade a committed antirealist. I am not sure if you intended to convey that you were not interested in engaging with antirealists, but I certainly hope that isn't the case. I am interested in engaging with realists. Even if we cannot persuade one another, directly discussing one another's views can be both informative and help us refine our perspective. So I hope you support further engagement from antirealists.
I'd also add that I am not so sure I'm committed to antirealism in any direct way. I am committed to endorsing whatever position I believe is backed by the best reasons and evidence; it's possible to convince me of anything, moral realism included. So, I think I could be persuaded, by pretty conventional standards of what would constitute good reasons for endorsing a view.
In any case, I am delighted to see this series of posts in defense of moral realism, and I hope you will take my criticisms in the spirit they are intended: I am deeply interested in understanding the realist position and I think the best way to do so is to talk to realists, rather than just read what they have to say. Anyway, on to my remarks:
I suspect you may be right that enlightement concerns may play some causal role in the proliferation of moral antirealism. However, speaking for myself, I do not reject realism out of a commitment to physicalism. It’s not that value realism is “spooky” - I’m not quite sure what that means, it’s that it seems to me to be conceptually confused and explanatorily unnecessary. Furthermore, I believe we can explain why some people would think value realism is true without thinking value realism is true, and I think these explanations are better and more plausible than value realism being true.
You state: “This is why the same individuals who are happy to talk about quarks, gluons, multiverses, parallel worlds, and the like often become queasy when asked to believe that pain really is, in itself, bad.”
Perhaps some antirealists think this way. But if so, you’re targeting a fairly weak form of antirealism.
Quarks, gluons, and so forth can figure into our explanations of phenomena in ways that I don’t think suggesting that pain “really is, in itself, bad” do. In other words, the weird stuff posed by physics is weird in the sense that it doesn’t seem intuitive. But it does seem useful in making predictions and understanding how the world is. I don’t think value realism exhibits similar explanatory utility.
You state, “According to Subjectivism, the severely depressed person does not err about anything at all and so has no reason to attempt to escape the grip of depression.”
That’s not necessarily true. A person can both lack a desire to X, but also have a desire that they desire to X. In that case, the person could still err and still have a reason to escape the grip of depression: that reason being that they don’t want to be depressed.
We do not need value realism to judge that a person who is depressed would be better off not being depressed, where by “better” we mean something entirely subjective. I think I would be better off if I weren’t depressed, but I think I’d only be better off relative to some standard, such as my own standards. A depressed person might say they wouldn’t be better off. Perhaps they’re confused or mistaken. Or perhaps they have unusual preferences, but aren’t mistaken. All of this is consistent with antirealism. Nothing about depression seems to me to call for value realism.
Hope all is well! Cheers!