The problem of free will is one of the more vexing problems in philosophy, as well as one that seems to have important practical ramifications given its bearing upon great questions relating to ethics, theology, interpersonal relationships, political theory, criminal justice, and more. It is a problem that has considerable
>>>For if no one is ultimately responsible for what they do, then (contra the retributivists) there is nothing intrinsically valuable in anyone’s suffering.<<<
I would say that *even if* libertarian Free Will is true, and agents really can be ultimately morally responsible for their evil acts, that *even then* there would be nothing intrinsically valuable in their suffering. Even in that case, I think the only value to suffering is its ability to change behavior and deter evil actions.
BTW, I think the arguments against the coherency of LFW are conclusive... but I believe in it anyway 🤷🏻♂️--albeit in a very limited capacity. I guess I'd have to consider myself a mysterian about LFW.
>>>For if no one is ultimately responsible for what they do, then (contra the retributivists) there is nothing intrinsically valuable in anyone’s suffering.<<<
I would say that *even if* libertarian Free Will is true, and agents really can be ultimately morally responsible for their evil acts, that *even then* there would be nothing intrinsically valuable in their suffering. Even in that case, I think the only value to suffering is its ability to change behavior and deter evil actions.
BTW, I think the arguments against the coherency of LFW are conclusive... but I believe in it anyway 🤷🏻♂️--albeit in a very limited capacity. I guess I'd have to consider myself a mysterian about LFW.