Wagering On Value Realism

A pragmatic case for believing that value is real and objective

According to a well-known line of thought developed by Blaise Pascal in his Pensées, there are, apart from epistemic reasons,¹ strong pragmatic reasons² for believing in God, due to the various benefits of theistic belief — both in this life and (if God in fact exists) in the next.

There is, of course, much to be said (and much that has been said) concerning Pascal’s Wager — but here, I want to suggest that a structurally analogous, and ultimately far less fraught, line of reasoning reveals that the ordinary person has very strong pragmatic reasons for affirming Value Realism: the view according to which value is real and objective (i.e., stance-independent³); that at least something matters, as such.⁴

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1. Value Realism vs. Nihilism

Whether one affirms Value Realism is of tremendous importance. It will determine, to a significant extent, (i) how one relates to other beings,⁵ (ii) how one conceives of oneself and the world more broadly,⁶ and (iii) how one structures and conducts one’s own life, in the very broadest sense.⁷

More concretely, if Value Realism is true, then it is at least possible that our lives matter (not just to us, but as such) and that our acts are ultimately consequential, insofar as our lives and acts could, in that case, figure in the set of things that matter. On Value Realism, it is possible to be right or wrong in our selection of ends, principles, and commitments.

Not so if Nihilism is true. According to Nihilism, nothing matters as such (i.e., in-itself). On this view, there are no ends which we ought, objectively, to pursue; reason cannot be practical (i.e., it can’t tell us what we ought to do); and there is no possibility of speaking sensibly in terms of our being more or less reasonable in our selection of ends. Nihilism entails that all of our acts are, ultimately, arational (i.e., not subject to rational evaluation or scrutiny). If Nihilism is true, then although our acts could be more or less conducive to the ends which we happen to have set for ourselves (i.e., more or less instrumentally rational), all of those ends would, in the final analysis, be arbitrary — and everything pointless and meaningless in the deepest possible sense.

Given the nature of the human psyche, the typical person will be better off subjectively (i.e., by the person’s own lights) by virtue of affirming Value Realism — provided that this person truly understands the bleakness of the alternative (as many do quite clearly do not⁸).

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2. The Nihilist’s Predicament

Consider the nihilists’ predicament. Many nihilists will be worse off, subjectively, to the extent that their nihilism negatively impacts their thought patterns and affective states. These people might well find their nihilistic outlook dispiriting, demoralizing, and depressing; that it saddles them with a deep and pervasive sense of meaninglessness, forlornness, and general existential angst. There would be something especially tragic about a mistaken nihilist’s predicament, since that predicament would be the result of holding a false belief. In this way, affirmation of Nihilism has the potential to sabotage the subjective quality of a life.

This is not to say we should expect all nihilists to be miserable. Many — I daresay most — will not understand the entailments of their own view or be psychologically affected by them even if they do understand those entailments; thus, subjectively, such people will be none-the-worse for being nihilists. Particularly malevolent or anti-social individuals might even enjoy their nihilistic outlook, feeling freed from the pangs of conscience and the bonds of normative constraint. So too a certain kind of non-malevolent slacker (insofar as affirming Nihilism conduces to feeling unbothered by any sense that a life might be wasted) and those with a particularly weak will who are perpetually unable to act on moral reasons (or what they take to be moral reasons). But happy nihilists, or would-be happy nihilists, surely are few in number.

Given some widely-shared assumptions about what would matter, given Value Realism, it’s likely that nihilists (mistaken or not) will be disposed to act in ways that it matters one ought not, and to value things which ought not be valued. This will be especially so if the mistaken nihilist is broadly anti-social by nature, or uninterested in pursuits which do not bring immediate reward. For on our best moral theories, our desires are unreliable guides to stance-independent value; thus, one who regards one’s desires as one’s only reasons for action will tend to be disinclined towards what matters (if anything matters). Insofar as we have pragmatic reason to mitigate the risk of becoming agents disposed to wrong action, we have such reason not to be nihilists.

Granted, this reason will not be decisive in all cases. One could, despite being correct about the existence of stance-independent value, be utterly mistaken about what has value; if one has a perverse theory of value, then it is likely that one will be actively motivated to behave as one ought not. Thus, if anything matters, it might matter that would-be fanatics are nihilists. Additionally, even believing the truth about what is good and what is bad may not suffice to ensure that one actually lives a good life: one might, for example, be stuck with a terrible character, or with a terribly weak will, such that one consistently pursues what one believes - correctly - to be bad. Such a person might as well be a nihilist.

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3. The Ordinary Person Should Be a Value Realist

The ordinary person is neither a happy nihilist, nor chronically weak-willed, nor a would-be fanatic. Therefore, the ordinary person can be expected to benefit, subjectively, from affirming Value Realism, even if the view is false.

Moreover, if Value Realism is true, then there is at least the possibility that a person who affirms it is also correct about some of major specifics about what matters and about how best to live — and manages generally to live in exactly that way. That is the best-case-scenario and, therefore, one that we all have strong pragmatic reason to bring about insofar as we can.

Thus, the ordinary person, S, has very strong pragmatic reason to believe that Value Realism is true, (i) insofar as S would be made subjectively better off by doing so and (ii) insofar as S is more likely to act ethically in virtue of affirming Value Realism (and has pragmatic reason to act in accordance with the demands of morality). In this way, S really has nothing to lose — and, quite literally, a world of value to gain — by wagering on Value Realism. We can construct The Value Realist’s Wager as follows:

(1) Whether we believe that Value Realism is true is, to some extent, under our control.

(2) All else being equal, we ought, pragmatically, to do what is likely to make us better off subjectively.

(3) Granted that they understand the relevant positions and their major entailments, most people will be subjectively much better off in virtue of affirming, rather than denying, Value Realism.

Therefore,

(4) All else being equal, we ought, pragmatically, to affirm Value Realism is true.

Premise (1) assumes the truth of at least a very weak form of Doxastic Voluntarism, according to which we exercise some degree of control at least over our future beliefs (e.g., so that I can now affect what I will in the future believe by choosing which books I read, with whom I spend my time, and so forth). That assumption seems to me to be on firm footing (if not simply obviously true).

Premise (2) is, I think, a straightforward claim about pragmatic rationality: namely, that what is pragmatically rational for us to do is in large part, if not entirely, a function of what will make us better off, subjectively.

Thus, it is Premise (3) that is doing the real work in this argument and which the previous section was intended to motivate. The thought, in summary, is this: For most of us, regardless of whether we have consciously thought it through, it is the case that our subjective well-being is tied to the notion that there is stance-independent value, such that coming to believe that there was no such value would make us worse off, subjectively. Indeed, I doubt that the thought there is no such value, if properly understood, is psychologically sustainable for any significant length of time at all (yes: I think those who affirm metaethical anti-realism are, in some deep way, confused — either about the view they affirm or introspectively about the reality of their own doxastic attitude towards it). From this, given an uncontroversial assumption about pragmatic rationality - and in view of the fact that if Nihilism is true, then there is nothing wrong with believing otherwise - I understand it to follow that we ought, insofar as we can, to affirm Value Realism.

By my lights, the real significance of the conclusion lies in its implication that even if one is unpersuaded by the arguments for the truth of Value Realism, one should still affirm it on purely pragmatic grounds. So, in other words, one need not devote a lifetime of study to the most difficult questions of Value Theory prior to being able to rationally affirm that there is value in the world that is not merely projected or constructed.

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4. Some Objections Considered

One might be tempted to trot out slightly reformulated versions of perennial objections to Pascal’s Wager in response The Value Realist’s Wager. However, I think most of those objections can be successfully reformulated. Certainly the one according to which there is something morally or epistemically objectionable about believing in God on the basis of a pragmatic calculation will fall flat, given that there could be no standard by which forming beliefs for pragmatic reasons would be wrong if nothing mattered stance-independently.

Additionally, The Pragmatic Wager, as I have formulated it, does not invoke infinite value and is not cashed in terms of expected utility. So, difficult questions concerning the nature (and possibility) of infinite value, how to fit infinite value into an expected utility calculus, do not arise.

Some atheists insist that Pascal’s Wager never gets off the ground for them, because they are subjectively certain of God’s nonexistence; in the same vein, one might insist that one is subjectively certain that Value Realism is false. While I would question the wisdom of such a person, I am happy to concede that the person could rationally remain an anti-realist — if (as I seriously doubt) subjective certainty about Value Anti-Realism could be rational for anyone in the first place.

Some might reject Pascal’s Wager because they reject Doxastic Voluntarism, according to we exercise some degree of control over what we believe. There is good reason to believe that Doxastic Voluntarism is true. Most of us know from experience that, for example, the company we keep influences the propositions we are disposed to affirm. However, if it turns out that Doxastic Voluntarism is true, a version of Pascal’s Wager, and certainly a version of The Value Realist’s Wager, could simply be recast subjunctively, in terms of what would be best for us to believe, pragmatically, if Doxastic Voluntarism were true. The arguments would still then be of intellectual interest, even if not practically actionable.

The so-called Many Gods Objection⁹ might be thought to have a kind of analogue with respect to The Pragmatic Wager: one might think that, given all the disagreement concerning what in fact matters stance-independently, and given that if one endorses the wrong view, one might in turn be led to often act terribly - the wiser course is to simply withhold assent to Value Realism. The full thought might be stated thusly: If there is stance-independent value, I am more likely to act wrongly if I come to believe in such mattering; so I ought to remain a Nihilist. I concede that one who feels utterly at sea with respect to stance-independent value, having no clear sense of what is most likely to matter stance-independently (if anything does), might - depending on other facts about one’s psychology - be reasonable in remaining a nihilist. I would note only that such a person seems likely (a) to be overestimating the lack of agreement about what matters, (b) to be extremely rare, and (c) to fail to appreciate that one can (and surely should, given ordinary assumptions!) believe in stance-independent value without falling into some kind of dogmatism.

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Conclusion

To recount: I have argued that, first, most of us have a broadly pragmatic interest in affirming Value Realism. There are three reasons for this. With respect to the ordinary person, S, (i) S’s life likely to go best, subjectively, if S is a value realist; (ii) S reduces S’s moral risk by being a value realist (being thereby less apt to act wrongly), and (iii) S has the best chance of being acquainted with real value by being a value realist.

In the end, The Value Realist’s Wager simply gives formal statement to a natural, but rarely-expressed, thought: namely, that there could be no reason to be a nihilist — because if Nihilism is true, then nothing matters.

Some nihilists, I suspect, are involved in a kind of deep agential irrationality, wherein they suppose, without proper reflection, that being a mistaken value realist would be an objectively bad state of affairs - perhaps because they suppose in turn that believing the truth would matter, in some non-trivial sense, even if Nihilism were true. Setting aside the sort of exceptions of which I have already made note, I conclude that most of us likely have much to gain - and literally nothing to lose - by rejecting the bleak view according to which, in the deepest sense, nothing matters.

1. An epistemic reason to affirm some proposition P is a reason to think that P is true.

2. A pragmatic reason to affirm some proposition P is a reason relating to the practical benefits of affirming P.

3. A stance-independent truth is one which holds regardless of the stance (i.e., the attitude or perspective) of any particular individual.

4. Something matters as such just in case it matters intrinsically — due to its nature or one of its essential properties.

5. If one thinks, for example, that there are stance-independent reasons (deriving from stance-independent value) to care about the welfare of nonhuman animals and suffering children in far away places, this is more likely to lead one to make personal sacrifices (e.g., by abstaining from factory-farmed meat and by donating to effective charities) than if one denies the existence of stance-independent value and regards one’s desires as one’s only source of reasons. To anticipate: yes, avoid-anti-realists about value can be extremely generous. I think it’s likely that such people’s professed metaethical commitments fail to align with their actual commitments. Such a suggestion is apt to annoy these people, but it’s manifestly the case that we’re often confused about our own views — and that we often say things (and fool ourselves into thinking that we believe things) in the course of philosophical debate that don’t reflect our actual commitments.

6. The view of the world as devoid of stance-independent value is very different from the view of the world as teaming with value which ought to be recognized by those beings capable of recognizing it. The former view is that of a world in which, ultimately, nothing matters; the latter is that of a world in which things really do matter, regardless of what anyone believes or desires (such that the world really would have been worse for the Nazis’ prevailing, even if the only people left living on the face of the earth believed otherwise).

7. One’s life plan is apt to look different if one thinks that value is not merely a function of one’s own beliefs and preferences.

8. I have an error theory about this: most people are so full of desire, motivation, and concern — and so locked into their own perspective on reality — that the idea that nothing matters is almost psychologically impossible for them to entertain; things matter to them, and they’re generally unreflective about whether those things ought to matter to them (but on Nihilism, nothing ought, objectively, to matter to anyone). That human beings would be like this makes good evolutionary sense: it would have been highly maladaptive for Paleolithic humans to sit around wondering whether it really mattered, objectively, whether they starved to death or managed to find a mate and reproduce; thus, plausibly, we evolved to be relatively bad at thinking clearly about metaethics and, in particular, the entailments of metaethical anti-realism.

9. According to this objection, because there are many God concepts, and because believing in the wrong one could make matters even worse than believing in none, one should withhold belief in God